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Illusory Defense of Contributory Negligence
in Product Liability
George E. Bushnell, Jr. *
T HAS BEEN READILY and widely, albeit not universally, accepted
that the contributory negligence of a plaintiff constitutes a
defense for a defendant charged with negligence.' This has been
true whether the defense arises at common law, by statute or by
court rule. And it has been equally true whether, as in some
states, plaintiff has the burden of establishing that he is free of
contributory negligence, or, as in the majority of jurisdictions,
contributory negligence is a so-called affirmative defense.
But to put the proposition that plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence is a defense to defendant's negligence is to state an il-
lusion. For contributory negligence has never been a defense.
The fact that plaintiff was also negligent has never been, in fact
or at law, a denial of the truth or validity of the claim that de-
fendant was guilty of negligence.
Actually, for contributory negligence to have any effect at
all upon the outcome of litigation, there is an implied assump-
tion that defendant is guilty of the matters charged in the dec-
laration or complaint. As a result, no self-respecting defend-
ant today would or could rely solely and exclusively upon the
defense of contributory negligence and expect anything but a
diminution of plaintiff's ad damnum. For such a defense says
nothing more than, "Sure, I'm guilty. But Mr. Plaintiff was so
careless, that it was his carelessness that caused the damage of
which he complains."
It is respectfully suggested that juries and judges in this
Anno Domini 1963 just will not accept such a position-no matter
how skillfully conceived and argued-as a bar to complete re-
covery. They will see it for what it is, a plea in extenuation and
mitigation of damages. For the contributory negligence of plain-
tiff does not obviate or exculpate the negligence of defendant.
In the milieu in which each of us now practices, the political,
• B.A., Amherst College; LL.B., University of Michigan Law School; Mem-
ber of law firm of Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, of Detroit; First
Vice-President and Director, Detroit Bar Association; Member Negligence
Section, Michigan State Bar; Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association; etc.
1 38 Am. Jur. § 174, 848 et seq.
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social, economic and legal emphasis is on personal rights rather
than upon property rights. Without attempting to argue the va-
lidity or the propriety of such emphasis, the fact is that for a
period marked roughly by the end of World War II this is how
our law has been developing. Particularly is this true in the
field of negligence. Therefore, the naked argument of contrib-
utory negligence, if given any credence at all, is equated with
comparative negligence known familiarly to Proctors in Ad-
miralty. This observation is made in spite of the overwhelming
rejection of comparative negligence by the various states,2 and
in spite of the fact that the decided weight of authority is that
contributory negligence is not susceptible of division into degrees
or percentages. 3 However we all know that juries and trial
judges without juries make every effort to do justice and that
the compromise verdict is the rule rather than the exception.
What better way to assure some verdict for plaintiff in the usual
case than to defend on the basis of the naked defense of con-
tributory negligence? There is no better invitation to com-
promise.
All of this is particularly true, of course, in the defense of
product liability cases. Here we have a manufactured article,
presumably made by individuals having special skills not pos-
sessed by the general public, impersonally introduced into the
rivers of commerce by a "corporate giant," who obtained for its
efforts an irrebuttably presumptive profit; and, lurking in the
minds of all, there is the dark suspicion that the profit was in-
ordinately, if not unconscionably, large for the article involved.
The only defense suggested is that the child, or the employee,
or the housewife, was so careless in his or her handling of the
product that such negligence overcomes the negligence of Big
Corporation, Inc., and recovery should be denied.
Assuming that contributory negligence is not a "defense,"
semantically, logically, or as a practical matter-assuming that
contributory negligence is truly an illusory defense-what do
we do? Do we abandon it entirely?
If the "defense" consists of no more than has been discussed
above, then the answer is forced. It must be an unequivocal,
"Yes."
However, the phrase "contributory negligence" has been
2 Annot., 114 ALR 831 (1938).
3 Mack v. Precast Industries, Inc., 369 Mich. 439, 450 (May 1963).
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss3/3
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
around for a long time. The philosophy of legal positivism is
predicated upon the proposition that even the client might have
some sense. The customary, the traditional, the natural reactions
-the cliches of life-must have merit, otherwise they could not
be so widely accepted.
Unfortunately, many defendants see no more to the case than
that plaintiff's fault must excuse defendant's negligence. This ap-
proach, however, begs the question. The question is rather, why
should plaintiff's negligence logically and legally bar his re-
covery? Is it because the product was put to an abnormal, un-
intended or unforeseen use? Is it because there was a voluntary
assumption of risk? Is it because plaintiff failed to exercise due
care?
An examination of these true defenses may well suggest
some answers.
I. Abnormal, Unintended, or Unforeseen Use
When the defendant righteously and indignantly denies re-
sponsibility for plaintiff's injury, more often than not his argu-
ment is that the use to which the product was put was a use not
intended by the manufacturer. This may be a use that was com-
pletely foreign to the original purpose of the product. Or it may
be a use for which the product was not designed, but for which
it was utilized due to the fiendish ingenuity frequently displayed
by those who later appear as plaintiffs in personal injury actions.
In the latter instance, the question then becomes whether or not
the manufacturer should reasonably have foreseen the use to
which the product was put. A 1960 decision out of the 7th Circuit
did hold that abnormal use by plaintiff of defendant's product
barred his recovery as a matter of law under the Wisconsin com-
parative negligence statute. In this case plaintiff, in order to drive
a hammer claw under a nailhead, hit the striking face of the ham-
mer with the striking face of another hammer. A chip from one
of the striking faces was caused to dislodge, flew in the plaintiff's
eye, and he lost his sight. Even though the Court was con-
sidering the case in light of a comparative negligence situa-
tion, the 7th Circuit held that plaintiff's action was 100 per cent
the total cause of negligence and, therefore, any recovery was
barred.4
Query: Could the Court have decided with equal force that
4 Odekirk v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 274 F. 2d 441 (7th Cir. 1960).
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the manufacturer of metal hammers could well have foreseen
such a use as that to which plaintiff put his hammer and, there-
fore, the question of plaintiff's negligence was a jury question?
See Borg-Warner Corp. v. Heine,5 and the dissent therein.
A fact of life which must be recognized in any consideration
of product liability cases is that, with very few exceptions (which
are not expected to long endure), a product liability action
brought in any jurisdiction involves at least two counts, and
frequently three counts. There is the count for negligence,
of course; and there is a count for breach of implied warranty;
and a count for breach of express warranty. Whether or not con-
tributory negligence in and of itself constitutes a defense to
breach of warranty is subject to a conflict of authority.' How-
ever, an abnormal or unintended use has been held to be a "de-
fense" to breach of warranty cases. Massachusetts in 1958 held
that where a beer can opener which was designed to make holes
in metal cans was inappropriately used as a lever to pry open a
glass jar, plaintiff was barred from recovering.7 An earlier case
in New York involved an action for breach of warranty when
the purchaser of a chaise longue was injured when folding the
contraption. The Court found that the evidence established that
the chaise longue functioned exactly as intended, was not in-
herently dangerous, and did not have hidden defects. It was held
that an implied warranty of fitness for use applies only to a
usual or apparent use, and not as to an injury received through
"careless handling of dangerous portions of the mechanism sold."
The Court went on to say that implied warranty, under the Sales
Act, does not include a warranty that the article must be acci-
dent proof: "The defendants were not required to guard against
hazards apparent to the plaintiff, or protect her against injuries
through her own patently careless and improvident conduct." 8
Another area of unforeseen or unintended use that may con-
stitute a real defense is where defendant has clearly and intel-
ligibly warned or instructed the potential user of the product by
use of label or other device. Massachusetts has said in Taylor
v. Jacobson9 that when the product is not put to its ordinary use,
or not used in accordance with reasonable instructions which
5 128 F. 2d 657 (6th Cir. 1942).
6 1 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, § 16.01[3] (1961).
7 Vincent v. Nicholas E. Tsiknas Co., 337 Mass. 726, 151 N. E. 2d 263 (1958).
8 Poretz v. R. H. Macy and Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 2d 211 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
9 336 Mass. 709, 147 N. E. 2d 770 (1958).
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were known, or should have been known, to the purchaser, there
is no liability upon the manufacturer. In this case, hair dye was
used without a patch test which was clearly called for by the
label. Plaintiff suffered an allergic reaction.
In New York the plaintiff testified that she had read and
understood the instructions on the label. Here the directions
clearly stated that the product, dry-cleaning fluid, should only
be used in a well ventilated room, or out of doors. In spite of
such clear instructions, plaintiff cleaned the clothes in a small
bathroom with no cross-ventilation. The fumes from the fluid
made her ill. The Court held, as a matter of law, that plaintiff
had failed to use reasonable care, i.e., had failed to follow in-
structions.10
The claim of one Margaret Shaw against Calgon, Inc.,1" was
considered by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1955. It seems
that Miss Shaw had been directed to use Calgon for cleaning
purposes and mistakenly picked up a box of Calgonite. Re-
grettably for Miss Shaw and her counsel, the evidence established
that she had failed entirely to read the instructions. Had she read
the instructions, and followed them, then the injuries complained
of would have been an impossibility. The Court found no negli-
gence whatsoever on the part of defendant and an obvious unin-
tended and unforeseen use by plaintiff.12
The other side of the coin, of course, is that failure to warn,
or to adequately warn, obviates any possibility of the defense of
unintended or unforeseen use. 13 The very best that may be said
in these cases is that a jury question is presented.14
10 Fredenhall v. Abraham and Straus, 279 N. Y. 146, 18 N. E. 2d 11 (1938).
11 Shaw v. Calgon, Inc., 35 N. J. Super. 319, 114 A. 2d 278 (1955).
12 Bordonaro v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 287 F. 2d 954 (2d Cir. 1961);
Richardson v. DeLuca, 53 So. 2d 199 (La. App. 1951); Oettinger v. Norton
Co., 160 F. Supp. 399 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1957); E. I. duPont deNemours & Co.
v. Baridon, 73 F. 2d 26 (8th Cir. 1934).
13 Central Steel Tube Co. v. Herzog, 203 F. 2d 544 (8th Cir. 1953); Tomao
v. A. P. DeSanno and Son, Inc., 209 F. 2d 544 (3d Cir. 1954); Martin v.
Dengue, Inc., 25 N. J. 359, 136 A. 2d 626 (1957); Wright v. Carter Products,
Inc., 244 F. 2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Johnson v. West Fargo Mfg. Co., 255 Minn.
19, 95 N. W. 2d 497 (1959); Marigny v. De Joie, 172 So. 808 (La. App. 1937).
14 Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F. 2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Butler v. L.
Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F. 2d 623 (2d Cir. 1961); Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co.,
344 S. W. 2d 18 (Mo. 1961); Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla.
1958); O'Connell v. Westinghouse X-Ray Co., 288 N. Y. 486, 41 N. E. 2d 177
(1942); Panther Oil and Grease Mfg. Co. v. Segerstrom, 224 F. 2d 216 (9th
Cir. 1955); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A. 2d 850 (1945);
Karsteadt v. Philip Gross Hardware and Supply Co., 179 Wis. 110, 190 N. W.
844 (1922); Standard Oil Co. v. Lyons, 130 F. 2d 965 (8th Cir. 1942).
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II. Assumption of Risk
Further considering the type of case wherein warning or
labeling, and plaintiff's alleged failure to do so is in issue, there
are those situations where the risk is so great that, as a matter
of law, the Courts have held, in effect, that warning or labeling
would be a specious act. A classic situation in this respect is
reported in Hopkins v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company.15
Here the blasting foreman had knowledge of the danger of pre-
mature explosions of dynamite where the dynamite was placed
in newly drilled holes before allowing heat caused by the drilling
to escape. The court held that Du Pont was not negligent in
failing to warn of such danger since it was to be expected that
an individual such as plaintiff's decedent would have knowledge
of the danger, or should have been warned by the foreman.
Consequently, the assumption of risk was the proximate cause of
the accident. Another example of where plaintiff voluntarily ex-
posed himself to danger is found in Kaspirowitz v. Schering
Corp.16 Here a plaintiff who knew of a requirement that the
drug purchased must be obtained only by prescription, but who
obtained the drug without prescription, was negligent.
What the Courts are saying here is that the defense of as-
sumption of risk applies when plaintiff appreciated the danger,
or should have appreciated the danger, to which he was exposing
himself. That is to say, the hazard must have been obvious and
avoidable.
On the other hand, it is manifest from plaintiff's own testi-
mony that she knew from her own experiences that the
shifter lever operated only with difficulty ... The only
part of the machine claimed to have failed to function
properly at the time plaintiff was injured was the shifter
lever. The conclusion is irresistible that she was fully in-
formed of this condition. It follows that she, having con-
tinued to operate the machine with such knowledge, is not
in position to recover from the manufacturer. 17
The obvious corollary is that the defense of assumption of
risk does not apply where plaintiff did not appreciate the danger,
15 212 F. 2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1954).
16 70 N. J. Super. 397, 175 A. 2d 658 (1961). See also Pedroli v. Russell, 157
Cal. App. 2d 281, 320 P. 2d 873 (1958), and Sanders v. Kalamazoo Tank and
Silo Co., 205 Mich. 339, 171 N. W. 523 (1919).
'7 Gutelius v. General Electric Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 455, 99 P. 2d 682, 683
(1940).
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol12/iss3/3
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
or the risk was not obvious.' A defense was denied in Valmas
Drug Co. v. Smoots'9 by the 6th Circuit as early as 1920, wherein
the Court said that the statement of ingredients on a home
remedy eyewash was not sufficient to raise the defense of as-
sumption of risk because plaintiff was not a physician. Thirty-
four years later, the 3d Circuit held that conduct which might
otherwise bar plaintiff as a matter of law must be looked at in
a different light when the seller's experts have indicated that
the procedures followed by plaintiff were the proper way to op-
erate the purchased machine. In this instance it was apparently
obvious, even to the Court, that plaintiff did not have a fair re-
gard for his own safety in operating a hay-baler. However, in
spite of the risk, plaintiff's voluntary exposure was due to the
fact that he did just what the Allis-Chalmers demonstrators had
shown him.'
°
While assumption of risk is a most favored contention of
manufacturer-defendants, it is quite obvious that the facts must
indeed be gross for the defense to be sustained. Unless and
until the facts clearly establish that plaintiff knew, or should
have known, of the danger and clearly appreciated, or should
have appreciated, the danger, we have at most a fact question
for the jury and, in all probability, a judgment for plaintiff.
III. Failure to Exercise Due Care
Of lesser quality than assumption of risk is the defense of
failure to use due care. This is perhaps what is ordinarily under-
stood by the term "contributory negligence." And it is this type
of situation that will most usually present itself to either plain-
tiffs or defendants in their consideration of a product liability
case.
Further, we believe the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. The question of due care on
the part of the plaintiff is ordinarily one of fact for the jury,
but when the facts bearing thereon rest solely upon his own
testimony, and the attendant circumstances that are not in
dispute, the court then had the duty of determining, as a
matter of law, whether he, in fact, used ordinary caution for
18 Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F. 2d 120 (6th Cir., 1955).
19 269 F. 356 (6th Cir. 1920).
20 De Eugenio v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 F. 2d 409 (3rd Cir. 1954);
Miller v. New Zealand Ins. Co., 98 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1957) (Effect of
label warning dissipated by salesman's demonstration).
Sept., 1963
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his own safety.. . . Where a plaintiff is thoroughly familiar
with a possible hazard involved in the performance of his
job and with the means to avoid such, the fact that at a par-
ticular time he may have been momentarily unmindful
thereof, forgetful thereof, or have overlooked the same does
not absolve him from the duty of observing due care for his
own safety. . . . If a plaintiff has available to him two dif-
ferent methods or ways of doing a job, performing a task
or proceeding,-one previously tried and known to be safe,-
the other either unknown or unexplored or known to involve
certain possible hazards,-and he chooses the method or way
which is unknown and unexplored or known to involve cer-
tain possible hazards, and is injured in the process, he is con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law.
The plaintiff here was a licensed and experienced mechanic.
He was not a novice, or a mere passer-by. He had been
trained on the job. He had previously installed or helped
install many other similar doors, * * *.21
The rule as announced by the Illinois Court above appears to
be the rule even in a comparative negligence state. The Wiscon-
sin Court has held that plaintiff's negligent failure to air a room
before relighting a gas burner system exceeded any negligence of
defendant installer of the system. 22 Other cases of failure to ex-
ercise due care include continued operation of a motorcycle after
discovery of wobble and shimmy in the front wheel;23 continued
use of an allegedly defective "line truck" when it was known
that the cable employed on the drum of the "line truck" was
oversized and would slip; 24 continued operation of an elevator
in a customary manner even though plaintiff had been told that
this was not consistent with safe operation.25
However, as a practical matter, the vast majority of situa-
tions with which counsel is presented will dictate that whether
or not plaintiff failed to exercise due care is a question of fact
for the jury. This state of affairs has, of course, been recognized
by the courts: Removal of bottles known to be explosive in order
to protect customers from possible injury (an application of the
21 Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 494, 135 N. E. 2d 231, 239
(1956).
2Z Scalzo v. Marsh, 13 Wis. 2d 126, 108 N. W. 2d 163 (1961).
23 Saeter v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 248, 8 Cal. Rep.
747 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960).
24 Boerio v. Haiss Motor Trucking Co., 7 App. Div. 2d 228, 181 N. Y. Supp.
2d 823 (Sup. Ct., 1959).
25 Young v. Aeroil Products Co., 248 F. 2d 185 (9th Cir. 1957).
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"rescue doctrine"); 26 a fall from a standing position on an alumi-
num kitchen chair where the purchaser had not examined the
chair to determine whether or not it would support this type of
weight; 27 where plaintiff stood on the top step of a defective lad-
der which was perhaps known by him to be defective; 28 failure
to leave a burning building, the fire having been occasioned by a
defective oil stove; 29 continued operation of an automobile after
plaintiff had learned, or should have learned, that the brakes
were defective. 30
Finally, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of New
York, in the case of Luneau v. Elmwood Gardens, Inc.,31 has
suggested an economic exception to the proposition that failure
to exercise due care will bar plaintiff's recovery as a matter of
fact or as a matter of law. In this particular action plaintiff was
a carpenter who was well experienced with wood. He pointed
out to defendant that the lumber he was called upon to use was
in bad condition. However, defendant's agent told him to go
ahead and use it. The Court said:
While it is true, as a general rule, that a plaintiff who has
equal knowledge with the defendant of a defective condition,
and fails to avoid being injured by or through it, is guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law, . . . it is but
a general and not an inflexible rule for "one placed in the
dilemma of abandoning the reasonable course of his work
or assuming a risk will not be charged with contributory neg-
ligence as a matter of law if he adopts the latter alternative."
IV. Breach of Warranty
A great deal of confusion exists as to whether or not con-
tributory negligence, however it is expressed, is a defense to an
action for breach of warranty. It has been noted that there
is a split of authority on this question.3 2 The reported cases
28 Stroud v. Brands Punch Syrup Co., 205 S. W. 2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947).
27 Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.
2d 857 (1951).
2S Heise v. J. R. Clark Co., 245 Minn. 179, 71 N. W. 2d 818 (1955).
29 Drinan v. A. J. Lindemann and Hoverson Co., 141 F. Supp. 73 (D. C.
E. D. Wis. 1956).
30 Hembree v. Southard, 339 P. 2d 771 (Okla. 1959). (In Oklahoma, in-
terestingly, contributory negligence is a jury question, by force of Article
XXIII of the Oklahoma Constitution.)
31 198 N. Y. Supp. 2d 932, 937; 22 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 2d 255 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
32 Frumer and Friedman, op. cit. supra, note 6.
Sept., 1963
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have made such judicial distinctions as assumption of risk
and whether or not the product was being used abnormally
or for an unintended use. (See discussions supra.) It is
suggested, however, that the real distinction and the only
valid distinction is whether the count sounds in implied war-
ranty or in express warranty. In the case of express war-
ranty, the nature of the warranty arises from the terms and con-
ditions of the contract existing between the manufacturer or
supplier and the plaintiff customer. This contract may be in
writing or it may exist as a result of advertising. 33 The terms
and conditions of the contract itself govern. It will also be re-
called that contract, being historically an assumpsit action, did
not, in any particular, consider the question of negligence on
the part of defendant, or of contributory negligence on the part
of plaintiff. Thus it is submitted that if there is recovery under
a theory of express warranty, the defense of contributory neg-
ligence, whatever may be its form, is absolutely unavailable so
long as plaintiff relies on the "contract." It is recognized, how-
ever, that some jurisdictions have not adopted this enlightened
view.3 4
Implied warranty, however, is another matter. Dean Prosser
writes that today's action for breach of implied warranty is
"a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse of tort and
contract." 35 He concludes that, "A more notable example of
legal miscegenation could hardly be cited than that which pro-
duced the modern action for breach of warranty. Originally
sounding in tort, yet arising out of the warrantor's consent to be
bound, it later ceased necessarily to be consensual, and at the
same time came to lie mainly in contract." 36
It may be unequivocally put that the better rule, if not the
general rule, is that privity is no longer a requirement for an ac-
tion sounding in breach of implied warranty. Thus, it is urged,
an action for implied warranty is really no different in substance
and quality from an action sounding in negligence.3 7
33 Baliman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N. W. 309 (1939);
Hansen v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 276 F. 2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960).
34 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer),
69 Yale L. J. 1099, 1147 (see cases cited n. 288) (1960).
35 Id. at 1126.
36 Ibid.
37 Barefield v. LaSalle Coca-Cola Co., 370 Mich. 1, ____ N. W. 2d --- (1963).
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If that is the case, then "contributory negligence," in what-
ever form, may well be interposed as a defense against a claim
for breach of implied warranty. For example, continued use of
defective bags after it had been discovered that the bags were
defective barred plaintiff's recovery.38 It was held to be error
at the trial in not submitting the question of the owner's con-
tributory negligence in continuing to use an oil burner with the
knowledge that it was not functioning properly and failing to
properly maintain a heating plant.3 9 (This case also notes that
historically breach of implied warranty in the sale of goods was
a tort.) Additional support for this position is found in reported
cases from New York, Illinois, Missouri and North Carolina,
among others.40 Hawaii has recognized the distinction between
implied warranty and express warranty in Brown v. Chapman,4 1
and stated that the "better rule is that contributory negligence
is not a defense to breach of warranty where it serves simply to
put the warranty to the test." 42
But whether the action is for breach of implied warranty or
breach of express warranty, contributory negligence, when used
to mean assumption of risk, is a good defense. Plaintiff's negli-
gent rewelding of essential parts of a defective amusement de-
vice after defendant had delivered it to plaintiff barred plaintiff's
recovery, even though there was breach of warranty as well as
negligent manufacture and design on the part of defendant.43
Continued use of apparatus until repairs were made was fatal to
plaintiff in Cedar Rapids and I. C. Railway and Light Co. v.
Sprague Electric Co.44 Here the Court drew a distinction be-
tween contributory negligence in a sense of failure to exercise
due care to discover the defect and contributory negligence
where there was an unreasonable exposure to a known risk: 45
38 Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So. 2d 71
(1952).
39 Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N. W. 2d 861 (1955).
40 Darner v. State, 228 N. Y. Sup. 2d 997, 34 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 2d 363 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1962); Fredendall v. Abraham and Straus, 279 N. Y. 146, 18 N. E.
2d 11 (1938); Eisenbach v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 281 N. Y. 474, 24 N. E. 2d 131
(1939); Sloan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 193 Ill. App. 620 (1915); Finks v.
Viking Refrigerators, Inc., 235 Mo. App. 699, 147 S. W. 2d 124 (1940);
Walker v. Hickory Packing Co., 220 N. C. 158, 16 S. E. 2d 668 (1941).
41 304 F. 2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
42 Id. at 153.
43 Siebrand v. Eyerly Aircraft Co., 196 F. Supp. 936 (D. C. Ore. 1961).
44 280 Ill. 386, 117 N. E. 461 (1917).
45 Id. at 463.
Sept., 1963
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
ILLUSORY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
A party may not recklessly use a defective instrument with
full knowledge of its dangerous condition, to the injury of
third persons, relying upon the guarantee of its condition
for indemnity against liability for his own negligence. If the
defect were not apparent, or even if it were discoverable by
an inspection, but was not discovered through the negligent
failure to inspect, an entirely different question would be
presented from that arising here.
Other instances of assumption of risk are continued use of
seeds which were known not to be the kind that had been or-
dered from defendant; 40 use of unprocessed pork which was
known not to have been processed; 47 consumption of an allegedly
tainted pie when plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of ordinary
care should have known, of its unwholesome quality; 4s and the
eating of raw pork.49 Parenthetically it is noted that these last
two cases indicate that under certain circumstances contribu-
tory negligence may be interposed as a defense to an action
founded on violation of a pure food statute.
V. Conclusion
As is readily apprehended, contributory negligence in the de-
fense of a product liability action is a can of worms. But, if it
is recognized that there is no such thing as "contributory neg-
ligence" and that the defense contemplated is that of abnormal,
unintended, or unforeseen use, or is that of assumed risk, or
that of lack of due care, then there may perhaps be order brought
out of chaos. However, it is strongly suggested that even these
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